Understanding the establishment’s role in Imran Khan’s rise and fall — and what the limits of that power are.
Did the military establishment “bring” Imran Khan to power, or did he earn it through decades of struggle? Place 2018 and 2024 side by side and the most accurate picture is that both popularity and establishment influence were real at the same time — and that this influence has a limit.
Few questions divide Pakistani households more than this one: did the military establishment bring Imran Khan to power, or did he earn it through decades of struggle? The argument is usually framed as if you must pick a side. One camp says he was a “project”, installed by the agencies. The other says he was a genuine mass leader the establishment had nothing to do with.
The purpose of this report is not to tell you which side to support. It is to give you the tools to think about the question clearly. As you will see, the most accurate picture is not “either/or.” It is that both popularity and establishment influence were real at the same time — and that understanding how they interacted teaches you more about Pakistani politics than any slogan can.
A note before we begin: almost every source on this topic is partisan. The actors involved have argued opposite positions in different years, depending on who benefited. This report attributes contested claims to those who make them and clearly separates what is documented from what is disputed. Read it that way.
Before weighing the evidence, here are the two narratives set out as their own supporters would put them.
| Narrative A — “The Selected One” | Narrative B — “The Long Struggle” | |
|---|---|---|
| Core claim | Elevated by the military establishment in 2017–2018 through behind-the-scenes engineering | A genuine mass leader who founded his party in 1996 and built a movement from nothing |
| Key argument | Pressure on his rivals, redirection of powerful local politicians into his party, a tilted electoral field | Over two decades in the political wilderness; a surge among the young and the urban middle class |
| What it means | A “hybrid regime” — a civilian face on military preferences | Organic support that cannot be conjured by any agency |
Most evidence supports a third position that contains parts of both: his popularity was real and came first; the establishment’s help was also real but operated on top of that popularity rather than creating it. The rest of this report explains why.
The strongest fact in Imran Khan’s favour is time. A movement that takes fifteen years to build, powered by a consistent anti-corruption message and a charismatic leader, is not something an intelligence agency manufactures overnight.
For roughly fifteen years PTI was a marginal force; the 2011 Lahore rally signalled a genuine popular phenomenon, especially among young and first-time voters.
Whatever happened in 2018, the popularity came first.
Here is the analytical heart of the matter. The establishment’s real power in elections is not the power to manufacture popularity from nothing. It is the power to amplify a leader it favours and obstruct a leader it opposes — and these two tasks differ enormously in difficulty depending on which way the public is already leaning.
| Pushing with the public mood | Pushing against the public mood | |
|---|---|---|
| What it can do | Back someone who is already rising | Try to suppress someone the public genuinely supports |
| How it looks | The tools work quietly and look almost invisible | The machinery becomes visible, and influence degrades into crude, observable tampering |
| The result | Resembles an organic win, because it partly is one | No smooth, deniable way to produce a popular-looking victory for an unpopular choice |
This single distinction explains the puzzle of why 2018 and 2024 looked so different. They are the same power operating in opposite directions.
In 2018 the establishment’s preferred outcome and the public’s rising preference pointed the same way. The result was a victory that was simultaneously popular and assisted. Critics of the election point to specific, named mechanisms — so the common claim that “no one can explain how they did it” is not accurate.
| Mechanism | What was alleged | Effect |
|---|---|---|
| Electables | “Electable” politicians — figures with their own captive local vote banks — defected from rival parties into PTI; such loyalty-switching and the channelling of development funds has long been a feature of Pakistani elections | Ready-made local vote banks changed hands; Imran himself was criticised at the time for prioritising electables over loyal party workers |
| Pressure on the main rival | Nawaz Sharif was disqualified by the Supreme Court, then jailed, while many PML-N figures faced accountability proceedings in the critical pre-election window | The main rival weakened at the decisive moment — though it stayed competitive in the polling: an IPOR survey completed on 4 July 2018 put PML-N on 32 per cent against PTI’s 29, while an SDPI poll a week later reversed the order |
| Vote-splitting on the right | Newly prominent hardline religious parties, the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan above all, were allowed to contest in force | TLP took 2.2 million votes and no National Assembly seat; The News reported on 30 July 2018 that in at least 19 constituencies the winning margin was smaller than the TLP vote, and that in 13 of those it was PML-N that lost |
| Media and election day | Pressure on media coverage, the expulsion of polling agents during the count, and a results-transmission failure on the night | International observers were guarded; Michael Gahler, chief observer of the EU Election Observation Mission, said the day after the vote that there had been “a lack of equality of opportunity” and a systematic effort to undermine the former ruling party |
The fair counter-view: PTI and its supporters argue these factors are exaggerated by defeated rivals; that the youth surge and anti-corruption appeal were authentic; and that the win reflected real public sentiment. This view has genuine merit — see the 2024 case below.
By 2024 the relationship had collapsed. Imran had fallen out with the military, been ousted in 2022, and was imprisoned. His party was systematically dismantled before the vote — yet the public broke heavily toward PTI-backed candidates anyway, and that is precisely when the machinery became visible.
If establishment power could simply “bring” anyone to power, 2024 should have produced a clean win for its preferred side. It did not.
| Form 45 | Form 47 |
|---|---|
| The signed vote count at each individual polling station | The consolidated constituency total compiled by the returning officer |
| Witnessed on the spot by candidates’ agents | Where PTI and several independent observers documented discrepancies |
| The closest thing to primary evidence in the 2024 dispute | Candidates leading on the Form 45s ended up losing on the Form 47s |
A telling detail: Nawaz Sharif declined to return as Prime Minister. His daughter Maryam Nawaz said publicly on 14 February 2024 that he did not want to run a minority coalition government, having governed with clear majorities in all three of his previous terms. Even the intended beneficiary did not want to stand in front of that result.
The fair counter-view: The Election Commission of Pakistan and the government dispute the rigging characterisation and point to the election tribunals as the proper venue for complaints. Those tribunals have largely gone against the petitioners: of 374 petitions filed, 246 had been decided by April 2026 and 242 of those were dismissed. The specific seat numbers cited by PTI are contested estimates, not settled facts.
Place 2018 and 2024 side by side and a clear lesson emerges.
| 2018 | 2024 | |
|---|---|---|
| Establishment’s preferred side | Imran / PTI | Against PTI |
| Direction relative to public mood | With the current | Against the current |
| How influence appeared | Quiet, deniable “management” | Visible, crude tampering (alleged) |
| Did the establishment get its outcome? | Yes — and it looked organic | Outcome partly secured, but not cleanly |
| What it proved | Influence can amplify a rising leader | Influence cannot manufacture a mandate |
Because this subject is so politically charged, the most valuable skill is not memorising a conclusion but knowing how to weigh the evidence.
This report is intended for general civic education. It summarises documented events and clearly-attributed allegations as of early 2026, and does not endorse any political party. Where claims are disputed, that dispute is noted in the text. Contested figures are estimates, not settled facts.